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Abstract
The Kyle model describes how an equilibrium of order sizes and secu-
rity prices naturally arises between a trader with insider information and
the price providing market maker as they interact through a series of auc-
tions. Ever since being introduced by Albert S. Kyle in 1985, the model
has become important in the study of market microstructure models with
asymmetric information. As it is well understood, it serves as an excellent
opportunity to study how modern deep learning technology can be used
to replicate and better understand equilibria that occur in certain market
learning problems.
We model the agents in Kyle’s single period setting using deep neural
networks. The networks are trained by interacting following the rules and
objectives as defined by Kyle. We show how the right network architec-
tures and training methods lead to the agents’ behaviour converging to
the theoretical equilibrium that is predicted by Kyle’s model.
1 Introduction
The Kyle model, introduced by Albert S. Kyle in his 1985 paper Continu-
ous Auctions and Insider Trading [1], is a well known and often cited market
microstructure model. It aims to describe and understand aspects of insider
trading, liquidity and the value of private information to an insider. Our work
has two parts. We use neural networks to replicate the single period Kyle model
under Gaussian assumptions and then alter it, using the trained networks to find
Kyle equilibria where tractability fails to hold. For the theoretical discussions,
we will mainly be following Kyle’s original paper [1].
In the model, a risky asset is traded over one period of time in a series
of auctions. Since a risk-free asset is used as a numeraire, the risk-free rate
is set to zero. The market contains three actors: a risk neutral inside trader,
a random noise trader and a risk neutral market maker. The inside trader
possesses private and exclusive knowledge of the liquidation price of the asset,
i.e., the value at which it can be sold at the end of the auction. Based on this
knowledge, the insider submits a market order. The noise trader also submits
a market order, but its size is random. Both orders are aggregated and sent
to the market maker, who is unable to distinguish which proportion of the
total order originates from each trader. This way, the noise trader provides
camouflage for the inside trader, enabling the insider to make a profit at the
noise trader’s expense. The market maker then determines a price and clears
the market. Kyle proved in [1] that in the situation of a single auction or
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a series of independent auctions under Gaussian assumptions, an equilibrium
arises between the inside trader and market maker. Market maker prices and
inside trader order quantities are linear functions of their respective inputs, and
their parameters can be derived explicitly. He also showed that the multi-auction
model and its equilibrium converge to a continuous model and equilibrium as
the time between auctions approaches zero.
The model has several important features. A crucial one is that the insider
considers their own impact on the offered market prices. They need to decide
how to optimally use their private information in order to maximise profit. One
can also use the Kyle model to understand liquidity conditions of a market in
an auction equilibrium. A liquid market is, as written in Kyle [1], characterised
as one that is nearly infinitely tight (i.e., turning around a large position over
a short period of time is very expensive), not infinitely deep (i.e., one does not
need extremely large order flows to impact the market price) and resilient (i.e.,
prices tend to return to their underlying value over time). The Kyle model
allows one to study these dynamics in a quantitative way. Lastly, the model
shows how private trading information impacts the markets via the inside trader,
who gradually uses that information and incorporates it into market prices.
The market situation with its agents interacting with each other using fixed
constraints and reward functions is well suited to the application of machine
learning techniques.
This paper has a two step approach. In Chapter 2, we illustrate the theoret-
ical setting, show the central statements about the existence of an equilibrium,
and formulate the theory in a way that makes it easier to translate into machine
learning implementations. By replacing the agents with neural networks who
then trade with each other, we can better understand the nature and dynamics
of the equilibrium. Once an equilibrium is found by the agents, we can alter the
parameters and constraints of the problem and introduce new aspects. These
can for example include transaction costs, different price distributions or irra-
tional behaviour by one or both of the agents. In Chapter 3, we apply this
approach to the version of the model where only a single auction takes place
and illustrate our methods and results.
2 Setting
The single period Kyle model describes a market model where a single risky asset
is traded among three agents: a risk-neutral market maker, a noise trader and a
risk-neutral insider. At the beginning of the period, the noise trader and insider
submit their market orders (positive if buy order, negative if short sell order) to
the market maker, who then determines one price for both transactions. At the
end of the period, the noise trader and insider realise a profit or loss, depending
on the value of the asset and initial price. We first list the definitions and
assumptions within the model.
The value of the traded asset at the end of the period is denoted z and
assumed to be a realisation of a normally distributed random variable Z ∼
N (µz , σ2z). The noise trader submits a market order of size y to the market
maker. The order is modelled as a normal random variable Y ∼ N (0, σ2y) that
is independent of Z and any other elements of the model. It is assumed that
the insider knows with certainty the exact value z of the asset at the end of the
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period. They do not know the order size y of the noise trader. Based on this
information and with the goal to maximise his profits, the insider submits a
market order of size x = X(z) to the market maker. The market maker receives
the combined total of market orders from the insider and noise trader, x + y.
However, they cannot differentiate which proportion of the total order came
from the insider or noise trader. The market maker uses a fixed pricing rule
P (·) that depends only on the total market order amount X+Y and the market
maker’s goal of exactly breaking even on their own trade. Based on the total
order obtained the market price p = P (x + y) is set according to the market
maker’s pricing rule. Afterwards they take the position −(x + y) to clear the
market.
Both the market maker and insider are assumed to act risk-neutral. The
insider’s goal is to find the value x that maximises his or her expected end-of-
period profit while knowing the exact end-of-period asset price z, i.e.
max
x
E[(Z − P (x+ Y ))x|Z = z] = max
x
(z − E[P (x+ Y )])x. (2.1)
For the market maker, it is assumed that the pricing rule solely depends on
the total market orders. Indeed, the greater that total size is, the greater the
possibility of x being large, which would indicate that the insider knows that the
end-of-period price z is higher than the expected µ. Therefore the market maker
would set a higher price. The opposite also holds, the smaller the total order
size is, the greater the possibility of x being small, indicating that z would fall
below µ. The market maker would then lower the offered price. Since the market
maker’s expected end-of-period profit is given by −E[(Z−P (x+y))(x+y)] and
they have the goal to break even, the pricing rule is given by
P (x+ y) = E[Z|X + Y = x+ y]. (2.2)
The goal is now to find a situation where the insider and market maker are
in an equilibrium.
Definition 2.1. Let p = P (X+Y ) be the random variable describing the market
maker’s price whose distribution depends solely on X and P . Let pi = X ·(Z−p)
be the random variable describing the inside trader’s profit which depends solely
on their strategy X and the market maker’s pricing rule P . An equilibrium is
given by X and P which satisfy the following conditions:
(i) Profit Maximisation: For all trading strategies X ′ 6= X and end-of-period
prices z, it holds that
E[pi(X,P )|Z = z] ≥ E[pi(X ′, P )|Z = z].
(ii) Market Efficiency: The random variable p satisfies
p(X,P ) = E[Z|X + Y ].
Intuitively, the insider succeeds in maximising their profits given the market
maker’s pricing rule, the market maker succeeds in having a net profit of zero
given the total market orders by noise trader and insider and both the insider
and market maker expect each other’s behaviour.
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Kyle argues that under the assumption that Y and Z are independent, an
equilibrium can be found where both market maker and insider use a linear
pricing and trading rule respectively. The proof of this theorem can be found
in [1] as the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2.2. There exists a unique equilibrium in which X and P are both
linear functions. For the constants α = −σy
σz
µz, β =
σy
σz
and µ = µz, λ =
1
2
σy
σz
it holds that
X(z) = α+ βz, P (x+ y) = µ+ λ(x + y).
One important fact for our implementation is that for estimating the pricing
rule P (x + y) = E[Z|X + Y = x + y], a maximum likelihood estimator is the
’best’ course of action in the sense that it leads to maximum efficiency while
being the minimum variance unbiased estimate. Since the insider uses a linear
pricing rule such as X(Z) = α+βZ, from the point of view of the market maker,
Z and V := Y +X = Y + α+ βZ are jointly normally distributed. Therefore,
the maximum likelihood estimate of E[Z|V ] is linear in V and in this case is
actually the least squares one, i.e. the one that minimises E[(Z−P (V ))2]. This
provides an easy loss function for the market maker model.
3 Methods and results
3.1 Network architecture, loss functions and training
We implement Kyle’s model in a deep learning framework in order to test if a
pair of neural networks is able to arrive at the linear equilibrium using only the
base assumptions of the model. We implement and train the models with Keras
using TensorFlow as a backend. The models consist of a simple feed-forward
layer structure where the market maker possesses two layers and the insider one
layer of ten nodes each, both times connected to a single output node. As for the
model defining parameters, we choose a configuration of µz = 0.5, σz = 2, σy =
1, which we refer to as ‘non-centered’. We found that using large positive values
of µz for training would lead to the insider’s predictions being highly inaccurate
for negative values of z, as the likelihood of encountering such values during
training would be very low. µz = 0 (a ‘centered’ configuration) or close to zero
produced the best results.
All assumptions we make are in line with Kyle’s model, namely:
1. The noise trader market order Y and end-of-period price Z are indepen-
dent and normally distributed with the parameters we chose.
2. The insider knows the end-of-period market price z.
3. The market maker receives only the combined total of market orders x+y.
Next, let us describe our training procedure. We run a training loop where
in each loop we first train the market maker based on the most recently trained
insider, then train the insider based on the market maker. The very first loop
does not yet have an insider model initialized and we therefore require an initial
insider order function to train the market maker. We then plot the results and
begin a new training loop. In this way, we alternately train each actor with the
intention of both actors gradually learning from each other until an equilibrium
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is reached. Before we begin training, we thus have to choose a configuration for
the distributions of Z and Y , as well as an initial insider order function. We
usually choose an initial insider order function that returns values randomly,
namely normally distributed like the noise trader Y , i.e. X(·) ∼ Y . This
approach of letting the initial insider output noise uses zero outside information
to train the market maker. In the following discussion, we refer to the insider
and market maker networks as ‘I’ and ‘M’ respectively. I(z) or M(x + y) then
denote the network outputs when given an input z or x+ y.
Each loop begins by training the market maker. We first sample from Y
and Z independently, generating samples (y1, . . . , yN ) and (z1, . . . , zN ). We use
the initial insider order function (first loop) or the last trained insider network
(subsequent loops) to generate predictions I(zi) := x(zi) out of the samples of Z.
The yi are added to the corresponding insider orders I(zi) and result in a sample
of total market orders (I(z1) + y1, . . . , I(zN ) + yN ). For all i ≤ N , I(zi) + yi
is fed into the market maker neural network together with the corresponding
zi (which is only used in the loss function) with batch size one. TensorFlow
minimises the loss function of a whole epoch at a time. This loss is essentially
the mean of each batches’ individual loss. We therefore define the following loss
function for the market maker:
• Calculate a loss for each input I(zi) + yi:
L(zi, yi) := (zi −M(I(zi) + yi))
2.
• The total loss over one epoch of training is obtained by averaging all L(z):
Lepoch = E(Z,Y )[(Z −M(I(Z) + Y ))
2].
The model is trained for a number of epochs on the sampled data. Its output,
via a model.predict method, then defines a pricing function P (·) := M(·) for
the insider to use.
Next, we train the insider. We again sample from Y and Z independently.
The samples can be used directly for training, as the market maker appears
only in the insider’s loss function in what is a straightforward implementation
of equation (2.1):
• Calculate a loss for each input zi, yi:
L(zi, yi) := −(zi −M(I(zi) + yi))I(zi).
• The total loss over one epoch of training is then given by:
Lepoch = −E(Z,Y )[(Z −M(I(Z) + Y ))I(Z)].
The insider is trained and its output defines a new order function x(·) := I(·)
that is used to train the market maker in the next iteration. In both cases we
rely on neural network generalization which determines the functions outside
the initial training data.
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Figure 1: Assuming µz = 0, both neural networks learn the theoretical equi-
librium when starting with a linear (top), approximately linear (middle) or
Gaussian noise (bottom) insider order function.
3.2 Results
We train the model using a centered configuration with µz = 0. Each model is
trained for three epochs within one loop, with there being a total of 20 training
loops. While the models converge using as little as 2000 samples, we use 5000
samples of z and y for both the insider and market maker. This way, conver-
gence happens within fewer training loops and the convergence is more stable
in the sense that model predictions do not change much after first hitting an
acceptable solution. Figure 1 shows how both models converge nearly perfectly
to the predicted linear equilibrium. The figure also shows the effects of using
different initial order functions. Starting with an already linear (i.e. equilib-
rium fulfilling) insider function leads to fast convergence in around three loops
while an approximately linear initial order function needs five loops to converge.
However, the networks learn the equilibrium even if they start with an insider
function that is indistinguishable from the noise trader and they do so within
merely eight training loops. On our hardware, this training was bottlenecked by
the CPU (likely due to the necessity of setting batch size = 1), so we opted to
run it entirely on the CPU. A quad-core laptop CPU took around three to four
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minutes to reach convergence in the 5000 sample situation, and merely 30-60
seconds for 2000 samples.
3.3 Altering the model, part I: Non-Gaussian distribu-
tions for Y, Z
With our first goal, managing to train networks to learn Kyle’s equilibrium,
out of the way, we turn to uncharted territory and analyze the equilibrium by
altering some key assumptions. We first drop the requirement of independent,
normal distributions and later introduce transaction costs to the model. By
using the same training regiment as above, we can reliably find the new equilibria
in these situations that one could not theoretically derive otherwise.
So far, we have built and tested the model using various normal distributions
to sample noise trader orders Y and market prices Z. Normal distributions
possess a defined mean and variance, they are symmetrical with one peak and
no skewness. When dropping these assumptions, it is not at all clear how the
system may behave. One key fact used in the theoretical derivation of the
equilibrium is that the L2-optimiser of the market maker’s pricing rule is the
least squares one. This stops being true when Y or Z are no longer normally
distributed, as X + Y is then no longer jointly normal (even if X(Z) is linear
and Z or Y respectively remain normal). By choosing different distributions
for Y and Z, we expect to see nonlinearities in the pricing and order functions
that depend on the type of distributions and may correlate with how similar the
used distributions are to normal ones in terms of their defining characteristics.
To that end, we picked several distributions with different attributes, namely
the Laplace, Gumbel and Gamma distributions, as well as a bimodal distribu-
tion given by a mixture of two normal distributions. For the first three, mean
and variance are defined and we thus selected their parameters for each distri-
bution family such that mean and variance would match the ones chosen so far,
i.e. E[Z] = µz = 0.5, Var[Z] = σ
2
z = 4, E[Y ] = µy = 0 and Var[Y ] = σ
2
y = 1.
If Y and Z are chosen to both be distributed as Laplace, Gumbel or Bimodal,
the model learns and outputs not only a linear equilibrium, but the one corre-
sponding to the setting where Y ∼ N (0, 1) and Z ∼ N (0.5, 4). It is a somewhat
surprising result, seeing as the Gumbel and Bimodal input distributions are
recognisably different from the normal ones (see fig. 3). There are some slight
nonlinearities present in the Bimodal predictions around the origin, but overall
neural network predictions very much align with the linear optimum.
A second step consisted of leaving Y normally distributed as Y ∼ N (0, 1)
while altering the distribution of Z. We show results for Laplace, Gumbel,
Gamma and Bimodal distributions in Figure 2 while Figure 3 shows the distri-
butions of the resulting model input data as histograms. The results are more
mixed now. When Z is sampled from Laplace or Bimodal distributions, we
observe the same linear equilibrium as in the normal situation. If Z is sam-
pled from a Gumbel distribution, both pricing and order functions are linear
for positive and negative values with a bend around the origin. For each func-
tion, its two slopes are similar to the one predicted in a normal model. These
significant, but not major differences to the normally distributed situation cor-
respond well to the comparison between a Gumbel and normal distribution:
similar overall look, but small deciding differences (skewness). When sampling
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Z from a Gamma distribution, we thus expect to see larger differences to the
normal situation.
We have previously seen that the model struggles with data that shows exclu-
sively positive values. We thus alter the parameters of the Gamma distribution
to correspond to a mean of 1 and variance of 2, which produces a sample of Z
with values mostly between 0 and 2 and a significant tail. We then subtract 1
from that sample. The distribution is thus centered, but still with a large skew
due to being a Gamma distribution. We expect a result similar to the Gumbel
one, although the skewness is much larger here. We compare the predictions to
the equilibrium situation. Both function predictions are again piecewise linear
with a single bend around the origin. Both show a large deviation for nega-
tive values while having a similar (pricing function) or nearly identical (order
function) slope as the normal theoretical optimum. This result further indicates
that one, the model is very sensitive to non-centered data and two, skewness
leads to piecewise linear predictions, where the amount of skewness influences
how closely slopes align with the normal situation.
3.4 Altering the model, part II: Introducing transaction
costs
We introduce market frictions to the model. Concretely, we assume that the
insider now pays a transaction fee proportional to their order size. This is
implemented by adding a penalisation term to the insider’s loss function. The
new version works as follows:
• Sample z ∼ Z (as model input) and y ∼ Y .
• Calculate a loss for each pair (zi, yi):
L(zi, yi) := −[(z −M(I(z) + y))I(z)− ε · |I(z)|]
• The total loss over one epoch of training is then given by:
Lepoch = −E(Z,Y )[(Z −M(I(Z) + Y ))I(Z)− ε · |I(Z)|].
Epsilon represents the fraction of the total order size that must be paid
as transaction cost. This penalty only impacts the inside trader, so we do not
expect the market maker’s behaviour to change considerably. The inside trader,
however, should adjust their behaviour. One could expect them to not trade
at all in a certain price range where transaction costs would be larger than the
expected payoff. If we assume that the market maker stays unimpacted (i.e.
uses Kyle’s predicted optimal pricing function), then the boundary of that price
range would lie wherever the expected payoff is zero. Looking at the above loss
function, for a given z this happens when:
0 = E[(z − P (x(z) + Y ))x(z) − ε · |x(z)|]
⇔ ε = ±
(
z −
σz
2σy
x(z)− µz
)
⇔ x(z) =
2σy
σz
· (z − (µz ± ε))
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Figure 2: Model predictions when Y is gaussian and Z is sampled from differ-
ent distributions. Top to bottom: Laplace, Gumbel, Gamma (centered) and
Bimodal (normal mixture) distributions.
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Figure 3: Comparing input distributions when picking different distribution
families for Z. In order from top to bottom: Laplace, Gumbel, Gamma (cen-
tered), Bimodal. Plots on the right directly show the distribution of Z.
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µz Transaction cost (ε) Prediction Test result
0.5 0.01 [0.49, 0.51] no visible change
0.5 0.1 [0.4, 0.6] no visible change
0.5 0.5 [0, 1] no visible change
0.5 0.75 [-0.25, 1.25] [-0.5, 1.1]
0.5 1 [-0.5, 1.5] [-0.54, 1.44]
0.5 1.2 [-0.7, 1.7] [-0.6, 1.7]
1.5 1.2 [0.3, 2.7] [0.0, 2.7]
0.5 1.5 [-1, 2] [-0.9, 2.0]
Table 1: Results of our series of tests.
On the other hand, the range where x(z) = 0 holds should then be bounded
by the z for which z = µz ± ε. In our non-centered parameter setting, this
corresponds to z = 0.5± ε.
For our testing, we slowly increase the magnitude of the transaction cost.
The results, shown in figure 4, show several interesting features. The market
maker pricing function stays at the linear optimum through all of our tests. For
small transaction costs of 0.01 and 0.1, there is no visible effect on the insider’s
behaviour. Only when increasing the transaction cost to large values of 0.75 or
1 do we start to see the aforementioned ‘plateau’ in the insider order function.
The size and position of this plateau matches our hypothesis rather well, as
can be seen in table 1 and figure 4. The slight differences that are present
could come from the fact that the market maker does adjust their behaviour
slightly due to receiving an input order function from the insider that is not
perfectly linear (i.e. that shows a plateau around zero). This would in turn
influence the training and result of the insider function and could explain the
small differences.
In order to further confirm our hypothesis, we set µz = 1.5. The result,
shown in figure 5, shows that the plateau shifts accordingly and is again roughly
centered around the new value of µz .
4 Conclusion
We have proven the viability of deep neural networks for finding and better
understanding equilibria of the Kyle model. Our model architecture and training
method leads to quick and robust convergence to Kyle’s equilibrium. We can
use our method to alter the model, including finding equilibria in the cases of
non-normal price distributions and transaction costs.
Our next step will be to extend our approach to the multi period Kyle model,
where several auctions take place over the course of a single trading day.
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Figure 4: Comparing model predictions when assuming different transaction
cost (epsilon) values and a fixed µz = 0.5. Transaction cost values from top to
bottom: ε = 0.1, 0.75, 1.5.
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Figure 5: Left: µz = 0.5, right: µz = 1.5. The window where the insider
function is zero remains centered around µz , as predicted.
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